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Abstract
Background: The p value obtained from a significance test provides no information about the magnitude or importance of
the underlying phenomenon. Therefore, additional reporting of effect size is often recommended. Effect sizes are
theoretically independent from sample size. Yet this may not hold true empirically: non-independence could indicate
publication bias.
Methods: We investigate whether effect size is independent from sample size in psychological research. We randomly
sampled 1,000 psychological articles from all areas of psychological research. We extracted p values, effect sizes, and sample
sizes of all empirical papers, and calculated the correlation between effect size and sample size, and investigated the
distribution of p values.
Results: We found a negative correlation of r =2.45 [95% CI: 2.53; 2.35] between effect size and sample size. In addition,
we found an inordinately high number of p values just passing the boundary of significance. Additional data showed that
neither implicit nor explicit power analysis could account for this pattern of findings.
Conclusion: The negative correlation between effect size and samples size, and the biased distribution of p values indicate
pervasive publication bias in the entire field of psychology.
Citation: Ku¨hberger A, Fritz A, Scherndl T (2014) Publication Bias in Psychology: A Diagnosis Based on the Correlation between Effect Size and Sample Size. PLoS
ONE 9(9): e105825. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825
Editor: Daniele Fanelli, Universite´ de Montre´al, Canada
Received April 17, 2014; Accepted July 29, 2014; Published September 5, 2014
Copyright:  2014 Ku¨hberger et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: The authors confirm that all data underlying the findings are fully available without restriction. All relevant data are within the paper and its
Supporting Information files.
Funding: This research was supported by a DOC-fFORTE-fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences to Astrid Fritz. The funder had no role in study design,
data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* Email: anton.kuehberger@sbg.ac.at
Introduction
Theories are evaluated by data. However, since whole
populations cannot be examined, statistics based on samples are
used for drawing conclusions about populations. The p value of a
significance test is the main statistic used for making such
inferences. Yet the use the p value is often criticized [1,2], since
p values lead to dichotomous reject/not reject decisions, and to the
misconception that significance means a large effect while non-
significance means no effect [3,4]. It has therefore been
recommended that estimates of effect size (ES) should accompany
p values [5–7]. Reporting of ES has increased recently [8], but ES
are still widely neglected [9].
The Relationship between Effect Size and Sample Size
An ES is a measure of the strength of a phenomenon which
estimates the magnitude of a relationship. Thus, ES offer
information beyond p-values. Importantly, ES and sample size
(SS) ought to be unrelated. Here we provide evidence that there is
a considerable correlation between ES and SS across the entire
discipline of psychology: small sample studies often produce larger
ES than studies using large samples. Publication bias can be a
reason for a correlation between ES and SS (as we will argue here),
but there can be other reasons: power analysis, the use of multiple
items, and adaptive sampling.
Power analysis. Statistical power is the probability of detecting
an effect in a sample if the effect exists in reality. Power analysis
consists in choosing SS in a way to ensure high chances to detect
the phenomenon given the anticipated size of the effect. Thus, if
we expect a large ES, power analysis will show that a small SS is
sufficient to detect it. In contrast, if we expect a small effect, power
analysis calls for a large SS. This procedure of SS determination
leads to a negative relationship between ES and SS.
Repeated trials, or multiple items. Overestimations of ES can
result from aggregating data [10]. This occurs because, as the
number of trials increases, the pooled standard deviation
decreases. ES is computed as the difference between groups
divided by the pooled standard deviation, and ES will therefore
increase.
Adaptive sampling. Lecoutre et al. [11] showed that researchers
collect more data if the results are nearly, but not quite, statistically
significant, and John et al. [12] estimate the prevalence of
researchers having ever engaged in adaptive sampling to be near
100%. Yet, any stopping rule that takes prior results from a
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significance test into account (in an extreme case, stop if significant
and continue if non-significant) will lead to a negative ES - SS
correlation.
Besides these three main arguments for a correlation between
ES and SS there are additional possibilities which can result in
such a correlation. First, it might be that smaller experiments are
conducted in more controlled (lab) settings, or that smaller
experiments use more homogeneous samples (e.g., psychology
undergraduates) than larger experiments (e.g., ran via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk). Yet, empirical evidence does not fully support
this view as there are strikingly similar results from MTurk as well
as lab-experiments [13]. Second, in clinical work, smaller samples
could include the more severely afflicted cases than larger samples.
Third, larger studies can be multi-factorial, including crossed
factors that are aimed to study moderation of the effect, making
the ES smaller than in the smaller studies which tend to be uni-
factorial. This argument rests on the assumption that moderation
effects are generally tested with bigger samples. This is plausible,
but not fully consistent with the long known problem that
moderation effects are studied with strongly underpowered
samples and evidence that sample size of moderation studies are
not much larger than ‘typical’ sample size [14]. Fourth, it has been
argued that authors could act strategically and set up smaller
experiments in order to have more maneuverability when
analyzing a set of experiments [15]. Finally, in some lines of
research there may be substantive reason for funnel plot
asymmetry. For instance, in social psychological studies of (implicit
or perceived) discrimination those who are in a more apparent
minority position (e.g., minority students at an Ivy League school)
may be relatively more susceptible to certain effects, which could
also show up as genuine relation between ES and SS.
All these explanations may well be true to some extent.
However, in most cases when funnel plot asymmetry is found, it is
attributed to publication bias [16,17], We agree: The common
ground for a correlation between ES and SS is – directly or
indirectly – publication bias. Publication bias is present if
significant results have a better chance of being published.
Publication bias can occur at any stage of the publication process
where a decision is made [18,19]: in the researcher’s decision to
write up a manuscript [20]; in the decision to submit the
manuscript to a journal [21,22]); in the decision of journal editors
to send a paper out for review [23]; in the reviewer’s
recommendations of acceptance or rejection [24], and in the final
decision whether to accept the paper [25]. Anticipation of
publication bias may make researchers conduct studies and
analyze results in ways that increase the probability of getting a
significant result [26], and to minimize the danger of non-
significant results [27].
Publication bias leads to a negative ES-SS correlation, which
has been reported in some research areas [28–33]. However, there
could also be publication bias in studies on publication bias
(although Dubben & Beck-Bornholdt [34] find no statistical
evidence for this), and therefore the picture might be incomplete.
Our question thus is: Is this a problem for some restricted research
areas, or for the entire discipline of psychology? If so, how strong is
the relationship, and what does it mean for psychology as a
science?
Method
Sampling, Classification, and Analysis
A random sample of 1000 English-language peer reviewed
articles published in 2007 was drawn from the PsycINFO
database. As keywords we used ‘English’ ‘peer reviewed’ ‘journal
article’ in ‘year 2007’. Three articles could not be acquired,
another article was a duplicate. The remaining 996 articles were
classified using a hierarchical tree (see Figure 1). Of the 996
articles, roughly one fourth (23.2%) were not empirical. The 765
empirical articles were further classified according to basic
methodology: qualitative (13.6%) and quantitative. Papers were
coded as qualitative when the analysis was done by coding and
categorizing of interviews, pictures, videos, or similar data without
using inferential statistics. The 661 quantitative articles were
classified according to purpose: descriptive (8.0%), exploratory
(2.4%), or inferential (89.6%). An article was coded descriptive if
data were summarized quantitatively without inferring population
values by statistical means; the latter were coded inferential.
Exploratory articles used some ‘structure detecting’ method (e.g.,
principal component analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis,
multidimensional scaling, or neuronal networks). The 591
inferential articles were subdivided into six categories according
to statistical analysis used [35]. If several statistical analyses were
reported, we used the result that directly addressed the main
research question as stated in the abstract or introduction of the
paper, or if there were more research questions presented as equal,
the result that was presented first. That is, an article contributed
one measure only. In order to check the reliability of the coding,
50 randomly selected articles were independently coded by the
second and the third author. Agreement in the lowest, and thus
strictest, category of the decision tree was 92%. Cases of
disagreement were solved by discussion.
After excluding 9 quantitative reviews, and 51 articles using a
statistical method other than categories a-d (see Table 1) from the
group of 591 inferential articles, we extracted p-value, SS, and ES
for the remaining 531 articles.For 2 articles no SS, and for another
136 articles no ES could be calculated due to missing statistical
information (e.g. degrees of freedom) which could not be estimated
based on other given information. We also computed exact p-
values for all studies that did not indicate an exact p-value based
on test statistics and degrees of freedom. This led to the final data
set of 395 studies. SS was determined as the total number of
participants included for testing the major hypothesis. For the
computations ES: A Computer Program and Manual for Effect
Size Calculation [36] was used. ES for regression analysis were
converted according to Peterson and Brown [37]. We corrected all
ES as suggested by Thompson [38] (for more details see
supporting information S1).
P values were analyzed by a caliper test, which compares the
frequency of values in equal sized intervals just below and just
above the threshold value of statistical significance [39,40]. The
basic idea of a caliper test is that if there are considerably more
results below than above the critical value of p= .05, this value
does somehow affect what is published. Although one cannot be
sure about the overall distribution of p-values in published
literature, a drop exactly at the commonly used p,.05 margin
would be very strange. For the caliper test probability values of test
statistics were transformed into z values. We used the conventional
.05 significance level and thus the corresponding two-sided z value
of 1.96 as the critical value for the caliper test. Seven articles that
used a one-sided test statistic were excluded from this analysis as
they use a different critical level (z = 1.64) and thus should have
been analyzed separately [40].
Power survey
Since reliance on statistical power can lead to an ES-SS
relationship, we contacted the corresponding authors of all 1,000
articles by email and asked them to participate in an online survey.
In the survey we described to them that we had randomly selected
Publication Bias in Psychology
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1,000 articles from the PsycINFO database to extract the SS and
ES, and that one of their papers happened to be selected. Then we
asked the authors to estimate the direction and size of the
correlation between ES and SS in these papers. Of the 1,000 email
addresses 146 produced error replies (false address, retirement,
university change, etc.). From the rest, 282 corresponding authors
(33%) clicked the link and 214 (25%) answered the question about
the correlation.
Results
Correlation between Effect Size and Sample Size
The distribution of corrected ES and of SS is given in Figures 2
and 3. Since both distributions showed a positive skew Spearman
rank correlations were used to compute the ES-SS relationship.
The overall correlation between ES and SS was r=2.54 [95%
CI: 2.60; 2.50]. This correlation decreased a bit [r=2.45; 95%
CI: 2.53; 2.36] after excluding articles with extreme SS (less than
N=10 and bigger than N=1000; 54 studies). Figure 4 depicts the
ES-SS correlation for categories of different SS, showing that ES-
SS correlation was very high (r=2.48) for small samples (N,50),
whereas this correlation decreased to about r=2.30 for bigger
samples, and to r=2.24 for the category of the largest SS (501,
N,1000). Figure 5 depicts this relationship in terms of a linear
regression: the logarithmically transformed SS accounted for 18%
of the variation in ES (b=2.08, 95% CI [2.09; 2.06],
SEb= .009, b=2.42, R
2= .18). Put differently, a decrease of 1
unit in SS (measured in ln, i.e., 2.7 participants, non-transformed)
led to an increase of .08 units in ES r. Explained in a more
illustrative way, in a study with a SS of 50 we would expect an ES
that is .05 higher than in a study with a SS of 100, and .19 higher
than in a study with the SS of 600.
Table 1 reports the ES-SS correlation for each type of statistical
analysis. The relationship varied between r=2.28 and r=2.53
for the separate categories, with a sizable correlation in all
categories. We therefore conclude that the relationship between
ES and SS exists independently of the statistical test used.
Finally, we tested whether explicit power considerations were
the reason for this correlation. We measured the ES-SS correlation
in studies that reported power, or at least mentioned it in the
Figure 1. Decision tree for classification of articles. Note: aConfirmatory factor analysis; path analysis; structural equation modeling;
hierarchical linear modeling; survival analysis; growth curves; analyses testing reliability and validity of scales.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g001
Table 1. Correlation between corrected effect size r and sample size for different statistical analysis categories.
Statistical analysis category k rESxN 95% CI
a) tests for categorical data 41 2.28 [2.54; .03]
b) tests of mean difference and analyses of variance 184 2.52 [2.62; 2.40]
c) Correlations/linear regressions 90 2.36 [2.53; 2.17]
d) rank order tests 26 2.53 [2.76; 2.18]
Total 341 2.45 [2.53; 2.36]
Note: rESxN is the bivariate Spearman rank correlation between the corrected effect size r and the total sample size (N).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.t001
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method or discussion section. Only 19 of the 341 studies (5%)
computed power, and another 27 (8%) mentioned power. There
was no difference in correlation between studies mentioning power
and studies failing to do so: all correlations were significant and
negative (all r,2.35) and the respective confidence intervals were
overlapping. To sum up, authors do seldom use power analysis; at
least they fail to talk about it explicitly in their papers and the ES-
SS correlation in studies of authors who do report power is
essentially the same as in the studies of the other authors.
Results of power survey
The estimated correlations covered the whole range of possible
values between 21 and +1. Specifically, 21% of the respondents
expected a negative, 42% a positive, and another 37% exactly a
zero correlation between ES and SS (mean r = 0.08, SD=0.02,
median r = 0.00). Thus, on average, authors estimated that there
will be no ES-SS correlation, rendering power considerations
unlikely as the source of a possible ES-SS relationship.
Distribution of p values
Figure 6 displays the distribution of z scores derived from the
reported p values. The dashed line specifies the critical z value of
1.96 (5% significance level). The shaded bars represent z scores
that fall just above and just below the threshold for a 12.5% caliper
(lower interval: 1.71#z,1.96; upper interval: 1.96#z,2.20). The
figure shows a peak in the number of articles with a z score just
above the critical level, while there are few observations just below
it. Table 2 presents the frequencies for different calipers. The ratio
of published studies just reaching significance to those just failing is
about 3:1 – a highly unlikely result: the null hypothesis that a z
score just above and just below an arbitrary value is about equally
likely can be rejected for all three calipers.
Discussion
We investigated the relationship between ES and SS in a
random sample of papers drawn from the full spectrum of
psychological research and found a strong negative correlation of
Figure 2. Frequency plot of effect sizes r of all 341 valid studies with sample size between 10 and 1000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g002
Figure 3. Distribution of sample sizes of all eligible 447 articles. Note: bin from 450 to 500 includes all studies with sample size bigger than
450 but less than 1,000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g003
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r=2.54 (r=2.45 after excluding extreme sample sizes). That is,
studies using small samples report larger effects than studies using
large samples. We also analyzed the distribution of p values in a
caliper test and found about 3 times as many studies just reaching
than just failing to reach significance. Finally, neither asking
authors directly, nor coding power from papers, indicated that
power analysis was consistently used. This pattern of findings
allows only one conclusion: there is strong publication bias in
psychological research!
Publication Bias in Psychology
Publication bias, in its most general definition, is the phenom-
enon that significant results have a better chance of being
published, are published earlier, and are published in journals with
higher impact factors [34]. Publication bias has been shown in a
diverse range of research areas (political science [29], sociology
[39,40], evolutionary biology [42] and also in some areas of
psychology [43,44]) However, most of these prevalence estimates
have been based on the analysis of some journal volumes over a
specific course of time or specific meta-analyses. Based on these
findings one can only argue that publication bias is a problem in a
specific area of psychology (or even only in specific journals) and
yet no conclusive empirical evidence for a pervasive problem has
been provided, although many see pervasive publication bias as
the root of many problems in psychology [27]. In contrast, we
were investigating and estimating publication bias over the whole
field of psychology using a random sample of journal articles. In
Figure 4. Average effect sizes r for categories of different sample sizes. Note: k indicates the number of articles in each category. Vertical
lines indicate the 95% confidence interval for the mean effect sizes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g004
Figure 5. Corrected effect size r plotted against logarithmically transformed sample size. Note: Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence
intervals for the regression line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g005
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our sample we also found publication bias for getting published,
but our analysis does not allow identification of its source: failure
to write up, failure to submit, failure to send out for review, failure
to recommend acceptance, or failure to accept a paper. However,
as Stern and Simes [45] pointed out, individual factors cannot be
assumed to be independent from editorial factors, since previous
experiences may have conditioned authors to expect rejection of
non-significant studies [20]. Thus, anticipation of biased journal
practice may influence the decision to write up and submit a
manuscript. It may even influence how researchers conduct studies
in the first place. There are many degrees of freedom for
conducting studies and analyzing results that increase the
probability of getting a significant result [26], and may therefore
be used in order to minimize the danger of non-significant results
[27]. Researchers then may be tempted to write up and concoct
papers around the significant results and send them to journals for
publication. This outcome selection seems to be widespread
practice in psychology [12], which implies a lot of false positive
results in the literature and a massive overestimation of ES,
especially in meta-analyses. What is often reported as the ‘‘mean
effect size’’ of a body of research can, in extreme cases, actually be
the mean ES of the tail of the distribution that only consists of
overestimations. Consequently, a substantial part of what we think
is secure knowledge might actually be (statistical) errors [46–49].
Ioannidis [50], for example, analyzed frequently cited clinical
studies and their later replications. He found that many studies,
especially those of small SS, reported stronger effects than larger
subsequent studies, i.e., replication studies found smaller ES than
the initial studies. The tendency of effects to fade over time was
discussed as the decline effect in Nature [51]. Most of the reported
examples for the decline effect stem from sciences other than
psychology, but Fanelli [52] found that results giving support to
the research hypothesis increase down the hierarchy of the
sciences. In psychological and psychiatric research the odds of
reporting a positive result was around 5 times higher than in
Astronomy and in Psychology and Psychiatry over 90% of papers
reported positive results.
Publication practice needs improvement. Otherwise misestima-
tion of empirical effects will continue and will threaten the
credibility of the entire field of psychology [53]. Many solutions
have been proposed, all having their specific credits.
One proposal is to apply stringent standards of statistical power
when planning empirical research. A review on the reporting of
sample size calculation in randomized controlled trials in medicine
found that 95% of 215 analyzed articles reported sample size
calculations [54]. In comparison, only about 3% of psychological
articles reported statistical power analyses [8]. However, the
usefulness of power analysis is debatable. For example, in medicine
a research practice called sample size samba emerged as a direct
consequence of requiring power analysis. Sample size samba is the
retrofitting of a treatment effect worth of detection to the
predetermined number of available participants and seems to be
fairly common in medicine [55].
Another proposal requires that studies are registered prior to
their realization. Unpublished studies can then be traced and
included in systematic reviews, or at least the amount of
publication bias can be estimated. For many clinical trials study
registration and reporting of results is required by federal law, and
some medical journals require registration of studies in advance
[56].
Figure 6. Distribution of z-transformed p values. Note: Dashed line specifies the critical z-statistic (1.96) associated with p= .05 significance
level for two-tailed tests. Width of intervals (0.245 i.e. a multiple of 1.96) correspond to a 12.5% caliper.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.g006
Table 2. Caliper tests of z-values.
z-interval over caliper under caliper p value
10% caliper 1.76; 2.16 15 39 ,.001
15% caliper 1.67; 2.25 22 58 ,.001
20% caliper 1.57; 2.35 24 77 ,.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105825.t002
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Another proposal is the open access movement, which requires
that all research must be freely viewable to the public. Related is
data sharing, which requires authors to share data when
requested. Data sharing practices have been found to be somewhat
lacking and have been put forward as one reason impeding
scientific progress and replication [41]. However, some journals do
encourage data sharing, like the journal Psychological Science that
earns an Open Data badge, printed at the top of an article. Finally,
open-access databases, where published and unpublished findings
are stored, greatly reduce bias due to publication practice (see
[57]).
Still another proposal is to install replication programs where
statistically insignificant results are published as part of the
program [58]. However, there is skepticism about the value of
replication (see the special section on behavioral priming and its
replication of Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 9, No 1,
2014), and on whether a wide-spread replication attempt will find
enough followers in the research community. After all, the payoff
from reporting new and surprising findings is larger than the
payoff from replication, and replications have a lower chance of
being published [59].
Emphasizing precision. We favor still another proposal: to
emphasize precision. Statistical inference is built on three focal
characteristics: the p value, the ES, and the SS. The most stringent
prescription for interpretations exists for the p-value: significance
interpreted in a dichotomous way regards everything below 5% as
irrelevant and useless, and everything above 5% as important and
useful. Prescriptions for the interpretation of ES are less strict. It is
generally accepted what small, medium, and high ES are, but
there is little research on whether this is true empirically [9].
For SS there is no accepted prescription; any SS is acceptable.
In consequence, the variance in SS is enormous. In our data set,
the smallest sample was N=1 and the largest was N= 60.599. SS
is an index of precision: the bigger the sample, the more precisely
can population parameters be estimated. We think that a valid
way to improve publication practice is by focusing on the precision
of research. More specifically, ES should be supplemented with
confidence intervals. The reader can tell from the width of the
intervals how accurate, and therefore trustworthy, the estimation is
[60]. Studies with large ES, but wide confidence intervals should
be interpreted with caution because they probably overestimate
the size of the effect.
Confidence intervals as remedy are readily available because the
relevant techniques and computer programs do already exist (e.g.,
Cumming: ESCI [61]). In addition, emphasizing precision does
not require that researchers dramatically change their attitudes
concerning non-significant findings, but only requires a minor
change in editorial policy and reporting practice. With increasing
experience researchers will be attentive to the additional
information obtained from the confidence interval of the ES and
will thus be able to evaluate studies better than by simply relying
on p values and ES alone.
Note that the information about precision may increase chances
of publication primarily for non-significant studies. The size of the
confidence interval of the ES indicates how precisely the study
managed to measure the underlying effect. A precise measurement
may be worth being published, irrespective of whether or not the
effect is significant.
Limitations and Conclusion
In a sample of 1,000 randomly selected papers that appeared in
indexed psychological journals of the year 2007, ES was negatively
correlated with SS. This indicates that it is the significance of
findings which mainly determines whether or not a study is
published. Our results stand for the entire discipline of psychology,
bearing in mind the following main limitations:
First, we sampled from only one single year of psychological
research. It could be that things are changing, to the better or to
the worse, and sampling from different years could help decide
how reliable our findings are and how dynamic the presumed
processes are.
Second, our analysis includes less than half of all papers, namely
those which were quantitative and for which we were able to
extract data on SS, p value, and ES. Those are empirical papers
that use mainly classical statistical tests. The whole trade of non-
empirical, qualitative, descriptive, and structure detecting research
is excluded. The concept of significance has no meaning in most of
these excluded areas, and our analysis does not apply to them.
Third, we choose our strategy to focus on the main finding to
avoid violating independence. Since authors tend to begin papers
with the best data (or develop their argument along the strongest
finding), our analysis is not representative for all results within an
article. Note, however, that it is the main finding that receives
most attention.
Fourth, we generalized over all areas of psychological research.
In some areas independence between ES and SS might exist. Our
analysis is coarse-grained and the general picture may not apply
for all areas.
These limitations should be kept in mind for evaluating how
challenging our findings are for psychological research. An
extreme interpretation of our findings is that nearly every result
obtained in a small sample study overestimates the true effect. This
pessimistic view is based on the fact that due to the high ES - SS
correlation in conjunction with publication bias mainly overesti-
mated findings tend to make it into publication. However, we opt
for a more tempered view: First, probably not all of the small
studies will be affected. In addition, there is no problem with large
studies: these measure the underlying effect precisely and tend to
find significant effects by virtue of high power. Most importantly,
Figures 4 and 5 reveal another fact: ES decreases with SS, but
does not vanish completely. Rather, studies using large samples
still find a considerable ES of about r= .25. These large studies
deliver a precise estimation of the true ES, which clearly is larger
than zero. We thus can conclude with comforting news:
Psychology has more to offer than just null effects.
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